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Available online 15 February 2014The UK government has promoted bioenergy for several policy aims. Future expectations
for bioenergy innovation encompass various pathways and their potential benefits. Some
pathways have been relatively favoured by specific state-industry arrangements, which serve
as ‘arenas of expectations’. Through these arrangements, some expectations have been made
more credible, thus justifying and directing resource allocation. Conversely, to incentivise
private-sector investment, government has sought credibility for its commitment to bioenergy
innovation. These dual efforts illustrate the reciprocal character of promise-requirement
cycles, whereby promises are turned into requirements for state sponsors as well as for
innovators.
Collective expectations have been shaped by close exchanges between state bodies, industry
and experts. As promoters build collective expectations, their credibility has been linked with
UK economic and environmental aims. When encountering technical difficulties or delays in
earlier expectations, pathways and their benefits have been broadened, especially through
new arenas—as grounds to allocate considerable state investment. Thus the concept ‘arenas of
expectations’ helps to explain how some pathways gain favour as innovation priorities.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).Keywords:
Technological expectations
Promise-requirement cycles
Arenas
Bioenergy innovation
UK policy
Intellectual property1. Introduction
Over the past decade, UKpolicy has given renewable energy
an increasingly important role as both an environmental and
economic imperative. Environmental aims include: reducing
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, moving to a low-carbon
economy and improving waste management. Renewable
energy encompasses solar, wind and wave, which convert
site-specific sources into electricity.
By contrast, bioenergy has diverse biomass sources and
energy outputs. But it largely depends on traditional processes
for converting biomass, especially from sources which have
been criticised as environmentally unsustainable [1]. To in-
crease bioenergy production, excessive increases in biomass).
. This is an open access article uimports ‘could have counterproductive sustainability impacts
in the absence of compensating technology developments or
identification of additional resources’, according to an expert
study [2]. Along those lines, the UK government emphasises
the need for technoscientific innovation to ensure expansion of
‘sustainable bioenergy’ [3]. Multiple innovation pathways have
competed for public-sector funds, while also anticipating that
biomass sources may become scarce, more expensive and/or
controversial.
This paper analyses UK innovation policy on bioenergy
through the following question: Given various state funding
sources, how does each favour different expectations for
benefits from bioenergy innovation, thus giving priority to
some innovation pathways? Subsidiary questions include:
How have future expectations mobilised resources for some
innovation pathways more than others? How have some
expectations been made more credible through institution-
al processes evaluating and prioritising them for public
funds? In those processes, what have been the arrange-
ments between the public and private sectors, i.e. betweennder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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undergone change? To provide answers, we analyse UK
priority-setting for bioenergy innovation pathways.
The paper is structured into six sections. Section 2 surveys
analytical perspectives on how technological expectations help
to mobilise resources, especially through specific arenas.
Empirical sections correspond to the different types of
comparisons made here. Section 3 analyses how specific UK
arenas have favoured some expectations, as a basis for some
innovation priorities rather than others. Sections 4 and 5Table 1
Arenas of expectations for UK bioenergy innovation. The four agencies below ha
column outlines a high-level aggregation through an ‘arena of expectations’ with
involve industry, to fund types or stages of innovation, and to set criteria for succe
indicated in the ‘promise-requirement’ row.
Arena: selector
and/or enactor
Research councils Bioenergy capital
grant scheme
Host/funder BIS DTI, then DECC since
Bioenergy-specific
unit?
EPSRC Supergen Bioenergy since
2003 BBSRC BSBEC since 2009
Bioenergy-only fundin
its establishment in 2
Industry role Industry co-funding or sponsorship,
as an indicator of commercial
prospects, is an advantage for a
proposal in competing for RC funds.
Researchers also compete against
each other for such support.
Evaluates proposals fr
organisations, compan
public authorities, etc
Innovation stages EPSRC: ‘strategic research’, i.e.
knowledge linking with
commercial application. BBSRC:
fundamental science
underpinning later application
Conventional or nove
technologies needing
refinement or scale-u
Commercial
expectations
R&D results will eventually find
commercial application by
companies via partnership and/or
patent licensing.
5-year grant for energ
duction will facilitate
mercial viability and s
demand for energy cr
Favoured path:
example
Advanced biofuels via lab
techniques towards facilitating
the commercial stage
Minimal competition:
numerous diverse pro
funded, sometimes vi
grants
Expectations of latter
example
Advanced (ideally ‘drop-in’)
biofuels lowering net GHG
emissions from current transport
infrastructure, as well as gaining
export markets or intellectual
property
Various innovations
contributing to target
renewable energy and
savings
Promise-requirement
cycle
2009 expectations for advanced
biofuels by 2020 target were
explicitly postponed, yet support
was maintained via a promise to
bypass the ‘fuel vs food’
controversy and bring economic
benefits.
DECC had weak basis
evaluate promises or
impose requirements
technical progress via
BCGS, which was bein
out by 2013.
Contrast with other
pathways or arenas
Much less funds were allocated to
bio-hydrogen techniques and
fuel-storage cells, which face
many technical difficulties. Their
application would undermine
current infrastructure of large
incumbent energy companies.
By 2013 the Scheme w
deemed an ineffective
select the best prospe
innovation.analyse how some expectations have beenmademore credible
thanbefore through specific arenas, especially vis a vis previous
difficulties for gasification. For algal bioenergy, Section 6
analyses how this overall pathway was made more credible
in a specific arena; yet the significant funds were soon lost
through a shift in government criteria. Drawing on those
various comparisons among pathways and arenas, Section 7
summarises answers to the above questions; Table 1 summa-
rises links between specific arenas, credible expectations and
innovation priorities.ve given significant funds to bioenergy innovation along different lines. Each
distinctive ways to structure relations between selectors and enactors, to
ss. Funding priorities cannot be explained entirely by technical progress, as
Carbon Trust Energy Technologies
Institute (ETI)
2009 DTI, then DECC since 2009 BIS + EPSRC
g since
002
Advanced Bioenergy
Directed Research
Accelerator since 2008
All energy pathways, especially
renewable forms, since 2009
om
ies,
.
Projects often develop a
partnership with industry
(but not for algae
programme).
Established a club membership,
especially of large fossil-fuel
companies, which have provided
half the funds.
l
p
Generally near-market or
commercial use (except for
Algae Biofuels Challenge
programme)
Initial feasibility studies for the
entire supply chain, towards
upscaling demo projects, thus
minimising risk for any single
investor
y pro-
com-
timulate
ops.
Funds will ‘overcome
technical barriers that are
holding backnext-generation’
bioenergy, e.g. algae and
pyrolysis.
Companies together ‘identify key
areas for strategic investment’ via
real-world systems, towards
making them commercially via-
ble.
posals
a repeat
Algae Biofuels Challenge
funding R&D (2008–11
only)
Gasification, esp. for converting
bio-waste; and bioenergy-CCS for
‘negative emissions’
s for
GHG
Commercially viable algal
biofuels by 2020, thus
substituting for fossil fuels
without demand for
freshwater or land
New (or add-on) plants lowering
GHG emissions of current infra-
structure for fossil-fuel energy, as
well as gaining export markets or
patents
to
to
for
the
g phased
DECC criteria changed in
2010, diverging from
original promises of the
algae programme, leading to
its termination in 2011.
Expectations to convert any
biomass (especially waste) more
efficiently via gasification
became more important and
credible, despite UK's earlier
difficulties (‘picking losers’).
as
way to
cts for
Various public–private
partnerships were funding
other algal pathways for
diverse high-value products,
with energy as a by-product.
Policy language has emphasised
decentralisation via bioenergy,
but such pathways remain
marginal in priorities, which
favour large-scale centralised
plants.
Fig. 1. Arenas of expectations (n17, p. 160).
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As theorised by the ‘sociology of expectations’, early-stage
technoscientific development needs to mobilise resources on a
basis other than evidence of technical progress. This literature
survey looks at concepts for analysing such expectations—their
basis, role, credibility and arenas.
2.1. Expectations as potential requirements
Expected future benefits have been theorised as ‘real-time
representations of future technological situations and capa-
bilities’ [4]. Rather than simply predict or describe future
realities, moreover, future expectations ‘guide activities, pro-
vide structure and legitimation, attract interest and foster
investment. They give definition of roles, clarify duties, offer
some shared shape of what to expect and how to prepare for
opportunities and risks’. Expectations play a central role in
mobilising resources, ‘for example in national policy through
regulation and research patronage’ [5]. Technological expecta-
tions can help to convince funders and other practitioners to
support a development. Technology innovatorsmay exaggerate
their promises for several aims—‘in order to attract attention
from (financial) sponsors, to stimulate agenda-setting process-
es (both technical and political) and to build ‘protected spaces’’
[6].
Each pathway may undergo a hype cycle, which has been
theorised as a ‘promise-requirement cycle’. Technological
expectations can turn into requirements for the actors who
formulate them. Promises create tensions—attracting resources
and protection, but also returning as obligations. Through
‘promise-requirement cycles’, a techno-optimistic claim or a
promise may become a required action—e.g. a technical
specification to be fulfilled and/or political support to be
provided [7]. Through technoscientific development activities,
outcomes are assessed; new promises and requirements
become more specific. ‘This cycle may be repeated several
times’ [8].
Innovators may be required to demonstrate technical
progress warranting further investment. Given the need to
exaggerate expectations, ‘the frequent disappointments to
which they lead are accompanied by serious costs in terms of
reputations, misallocated resources and investment’ [9].
Different pathways compete for resources according to
expectations for their future performance, though they can also
be mutually reinforcing. In a case study of hydrogen fuel
storage, promoters sought to enhance the credibility and
visibility of their claims through ‘interdependencies of expec-
tations at various levels: the credibility of the generic
expectation of hydrogen as an energy carrier is built upon the
functional and specific expectations of the constituent ele-
ments of the chain, while these, in their turn, refer to the
encompassing vision’ [10]. These interdependent expectations
can become a double bind, [11] though they can also provide
more flexible opportunities.
The authors generalise as follows: such competitions among
imagined future solutions ‘result from R&D, political struggles,
activism of non-governmental organisations and, occasionally,
demonstration projects’ [12]. Likewise the converse: together
those dynamics can influence R&D priorities. Specific expecta-
tions can be socialised. For example, ‘technologies presented asthe next generation… are self-justifying because the notion of
next generation is widely accepted’ [13]. As this illustrates,
when widely shared, expectations can become ‘part of a
generalised and taken-for-granted social repertoire’; they
become a ‘depersonalized social construction’, not attrib-
utable to specific individuals or groups of actors. Whenever
they become societal assumptions or ‘collective’, such expec-
tations can even guide or justify the actions of thosewhodo not
necessarily share them [14].
When promoting technological pathways, actors' roles have
beendistinguished as follows: actors that create technology are
enactors, while actors that select technology are selectors.
Technology selectors have to balance several contradictory
criteria, whose balance can shift over time; ‘the fate of enactors
is much more related to the success of one or more tech-
nologies, while selectors can afford to bemuchmore indifferent
to the fate of a particular technology’. The distinction between
those categories is not ontological, since the same actor canplay
either role in different contexts [15]. Generalising from their
case study, the authors argue that key individuals act as
technology selectors towards technology innovators and
then ‘emphatically act as technology enactors towards their
[organisational] leadership’ [16]. Thus the same actor may
select and promote specific technological expectations.
2.2. Arenas of expectations
In the academic literature on technological expectations,
case studies have generally focused on actors within a
specific context, while taking this for granted. There is a
theoretical gap regarding how a specific context favours
some types of expectations more than others, especially
where multiple options compete for support. This gap has
been somewhat filled through the ‘arena’ concept.
When competingwith eachother, technology enactors seek
tomobilise resources via a collective social process in ‘arenas of
expectations’ (see Fig. 1). Here technology selectors need to be
repeatedly convinced of the technology's future potential:
These arenas can be deﬁned as the loci where expectations
are voiced by the enactors and tested by the selectors,
where they are confronted with experience, knowledge,
and interests… These multi-actor interactions take place at
scientiﬁc conferences and journals, in the wider media,
committees, research councils, and so forth [17].
From their case study, the authors further argue that some
future expectations became more credible by portraying a
specific technoscientific pathway as feasible, e.g. as a readily
available solution. In their case study, credibility depended on
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performance level that the technological option is supposedly
able to meet’. Proponents emphasised ‘performance measures
that are most favourable to their solution and less so for their
competitors’. They promoted hydrogen as ‘not only an option
with great potential for the long term, but also something that
is very much happening today’, e.g. in niche markets such
as forklifts and in test programmes with fleets of hydrogen
vehicles [18].
As the authors note, each overall trajectory has multiple
options.
It is not fully understood why some options are thought
to be credible and others are not…This is especially
problematic in those cases in which multiple technolog-
ical options compete for selection. In such cases, the
enactors need to position their option in relation to other
options, and selectors need to select those options that
they deem most viable… The arenas of expectations are
then the linchpins between those actors that enact their
technological options and those actors that select the
most promising options. In the arenas of expectations,
claims about future technological options are launched,
compared, elaborated and assessed [19].
Credible expectations can be analysed with the concept of
‘arenas’, especially given that ‘multiple arenas may co-exist at
various levels of aggregation. Highly detailed expectations of
materials or techniques are tested in different arenas than, say,
expectations about the hydrogen energy system as a whole’
[20]. The distinction among ‘various levels’ will be extended
here – to different sub-categories of a general pathway, to
different innovation stages, and to different relations between
public and private sectors – in our study of UK bioenergy
innovation.
As a metaphor in political science, the concept of ‘arena’
describes the symbolic location of political actions which
influence collective decisions and policies. Arenas are neither
geographical places nor organisational systems; rather, they
describe all actors' actions and interrelations around a policy
issue. Examples of such arenas include elections, markets
and regulatory procedures [21]. Conceptualising distinctive
issue-arenas has helped to explain why some actors and
arguments more readily gain influence there; each arena is
more favourable to some issues and framings than others
[22]. By analogy, state bodies sponsor diverse arenas where
technology enactors may promote expectations and seek
resources for specific innovation pathways.
In the general UK context, innovation policy has had a
strong commitment to the biosciences (aka Life Sciences) since
the 1990s. According to a critical analysis, this commitment has
rested on deep assumptions, in particular: that the relevant UK
science base is internationally strong, that this base powers
industrial success, in turn ensuring that the research will be
applicable in the UK; that the underlying science has cross-over
potential among industrial sectors; and that public expenditure
is justified by the potential for UK economic growth. Contrary
to policy assumptions, there is weak evidence of a domestic
linkage between R&D and industrial success, especially
given the global character of both [23]. Indeed, global
ambitions have been conceptualised as ‘diplomacy forscience’, which ‘seeks to facilitate international cooperation,
whether in pursuit of top–down strategic priorities for
research or bottom–up collaboration between individual
scientists and researchers’ [24].
In that wider policy context, UK research councils have set
and justified their priorities as ‘strategic research’, i.e. a strategic
response to current and future societal challenges. The energy
area exemplifies such engagement with agenda-setting for
research policy, according to an academic study [25]. From the
EPSRC standpoint, ‘Our research portfolio will be focused on the
strategic needs of the nation, such as green technologies and
high-valuemanufacturing, andwill retain the capability to tackle
future challenges and capitalise on new opportunities’ [26].
Drawing on the above perspectives, let us examine UK
bioenergy innovation. Its specific pathways and budgets have
proliferated during the past decade, in ways which can be
mutually reinforcing for ‘bioenergy’ as a high-level aggrega-
tion. Rather than analyse a competition for funds, this paper
mainly compares various arenas through the overall ques-
tion: How does each arena favour different expectations for
benefits from bioenergy innovation, thus giving priority to
some innovation pathways?
3. Research methods
In this paper, technological expectations relate to a detailed
study of state bodies' policies, as briefly described here. A
decade ago bioenergy was being promoted mainly by two
government bodies—the Dept of Trade & Industry (DTI) and
Dept of the Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).
Since 2009 the new Department of Energy and Climate Change
(DECC) has led bioenergy policy, shared with DEFRA and DfT,
the latter especially for liquid biofuels. Meanwhile the DTI
was renamed the Dept for Business and Industry (BIS). These
changes imply an increased plurality of state bodies andpolicies
promoting different expectations.
Public-sector funds for novel bioenergy technology have
several sources. ‘Strategic research’ has been funded mainly
through Research Councils—in particular, the Biotechnology
and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), and the
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC).
The latter has co-funded the Energy Technologies Institute
(ETI), self-described as ‘a UK-based private company formed
from global industries and the UK Government’. Near-market
innovation has been funded mainly through government
departments, e.g. via specific project grants or subsidy for
renewable energy. The study underpinning this paper used
two main methods of data gathering: policy documents and
semi-structured interviews.
Document analysis focused on expectations for economic
benefits and environmental sustainability. Initial results led to
amore systematic search of documents over the past decade, in
order to identify discursive patterns—among relevant bodies
and over time.
Specifically, the study analysedmore than thirty documents
from several bodies—especially government departments,
research councils, research institutes, parliamentary hear-
ings, industry and NGOs. As listed in the References section,
sources include: government departments (e.g. DEFRA, DTI,
DECC), expert reports that they have cited and generally
funded (e.g. AEA, NNFCC, E4tech, ERP, LCICG), research councils
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RFA, CCC, etc.) whose views elicit government responses,
and industry organisations (e.g., REA). We investigated how
difficulties in technological progress were accommodated or
bypassed through expectations for economic and sustainability
benefits.
The document analysis provided a stronger basis for semi-
structured interview questions, which investigated in depth
the policy process of selecting priorities for bioenergy R&D.
Face-to-face interviews have been carried out with 20
individuals from the same bodies which originated the
policy documents (listed above and in the References section).
The interviews lasted 30–90 min, with mean duration of
70 min. A topic guide incorporated key theoretical categories
of imaginaries. The topics were as follows: key national
research priorities for sustainable bioenergy; the role of specific
policy organisation; the priority-setting processes; accounts of
sustainability; future societal vision for bioenergy.
4. UK bioenergy innovation: shifts in arenas and priorities
In the UK decarbonisation efforts are stimulated by
mandatory targets under the Renewable Energy Directive
[27]. EU member states must obtain 10% of their transport
fuel from renewable sources; biofuels have been expected
to provide most. The UK must also obtain 15% of all its
energy from renewable sources by 2020; it seeks to fulfil at
least half that target through bioenergy—a great expansion
from only 2% in 2011 [28]. The UK has more ambitious
longer-term targets: the Climate Change Act 2008 man-
dates GHG reductions of at least 34% by 2020 and 80% by
2050.
Environmental and economic aims are combined in gov-
ernment policy. Through measures such as renewable energy,
Britain must ‘make the necessary transition to low carbon—
right for climate change, energy security and jobs’ [29].
According to the relevant Minister, ‘the promise of the
low-carbon economy is breathtaking. In jobs, in goods and
services, and in finance, green opportunities are not just
emerging. They are blossoming’ [30].
In particular, bioenergy policy seeks national economic
benefit of two main kinds—lowering national costs of GHG
savings, and creating or capturing economic wealth [31].
The latter can mean profit, jobs, licence patents, royalties,
etc.—according to the Technology Strategy Board (interview,
TSB, 15.06.12). Governed mainly by industry representatives,
the TSB has identified genomics as crucial means towards novel
microorganisms, enzymes and crops which can provide more
sustainable bioenergy [32]. Commercial benefits can be achieved
in various ways, e.g. via technology-licensing revenue through a
plant being built somewhere else in the world, or revenue
from constructing a plant in the UK, according to a government
consultant (interview, E4tech, 19.06.12).
Bioenergy features diverse biomass sources and conver-
sion techniques for various products. This diversity makes
bioenergy more complex than other forms of renewable
energy. Since promoting bioenergy at least a decade ago, the
UK government has not stated any specific priorities for
technoscientific innovation. No such priorities can be identi-
fied by long-time insiders (interview, Carbon Trust, 03.11.11;
interview, E4tech, 19.06.12).For renewable energy in general, UK policy has implied
that innovation pathways are constrained or even chosen
by external forces, thereby leaving priorities ambiguous.
Various measures are meant to ‘deliver’ government targets,
while variously attributing responsibility to innovation,
technologies, commercial development or the market [33].
Along similar lines, ‘The government does not pick winners;
industry is better at it’, say senior civil servants (DECC
participant, bioenergy workshop, 13.10.11; also interview,
DECC, 14.08.12).
While this view is widely shared by industry, it has regarded
support measures as inadequate, even for market-ready tech-
nologies such as Combined Heat & Power:If you [the government] specify that you seek to achieve a
particular trajectory and it is credible, then back it up with
policy that is investable, once you have got those three
things together, then developers might go ahead… But if
you say ‘We want to decarbonise energy use by 2050’ and
then you say ‘Wewill leave it entirely up to the market for
that to happen’, there is a lack of detail for it to be
credible. We know that the market will not do it without
government intervention (interview, CHPA, 19.06.12).
Despite the government's ambiguous language, funding
arrangements do influence innovation priorities. To fulfil
mandatory targets, ‘We are not backing winners in that
respect, but we do have an interest in steering to some
extent’ (interview, DEFRA, 03.11.11). Multiple policy aims
offer many opportunities to raise expectations and invest-
ment for several technoscientific pathways. These have
undergone ‘hype cycles’:
High versus low expectations is a continual process that
happens in bioenergy. That is, new products come along, a
hype cycle starts, and everyone says that it's great. Then
you get into more detail of doing it and you ﬁnd that there
are always issues if you didn't look at it carefully enough
before you started the hype (interview, E4tech, 03.08.12).
The rest of this section looks at priorities at two broad
stages: early-stage ‘strategic research’ and middle-stage
scale-up or demonstration projects.4.1. ‘Strategic research’
Early-stage bioenergy research has been funded mainly
through research councils. In particular, the Engineering
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) set up the
Supergen Biomass and Bioenergy Consortium in 2003. The
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC)
set up the Sustainable Bioenergy Centre (BSBEC) in 2010.
Illustrating the wider drive for strategic research, global
economic expectations have informed bioenergy R&D prior-
ities. Scientists' proposals advocate specific technoscientific
pathways as means to fulfil various policy aims and to
anticipate economic gains attracting private-sector sponsors.
Their financial contribution has been an advantage or even a
condition for a proposal to gain a Research Council grant.
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enzyme, sugar and energy sectors [34]. Such industrial interests
inform priorities for strategic research.
Resulting from those arrangements, bioenergy research
priorities have favoured specific trajectories, especially tech-
niques for converting lignocellulosic biomass into advanced
biofuels (also called next-generation, second-generation, etc.).
This priority gained further impetus from controversy over
mandatory biofuel targets increasing demand for food biomass
and causing environmental harm. To justify the targets, a
sustainable solution was foreseen in advanced biofuels
converting non-food biomass.
Proponents have emphasised at least three future benefits
justifying policy support and industry finance. First, the oil
and vehicle industries seek to recoup their past infrastruc-
tural investment. According to the Director of a Research
Council, for example, ‘Sustainable biofuel… is one of the few
alternative transport fuels that we could roll out quickly
using current infrastructure’ [35]. Expert reports recommend
R&D support for future ‘drop-in’ biofuels, i.e. direct functional
substitutes for petrol [36]. Second, future biofuels will provide
opportunities for UK competitive advantage in marketing its
technoscientific skills and in licensing technology: ‘theUK could
potentially capture 5–10% of the global market within select
niches of bioenergy’, e.g. by exporting intellectual property for
advanced biofuels, according to a report from DECC's Low
Carbon Innovation Co-ordination Group [37]. Third, to fulfil EU
targets for renewable energy in transport fuel, all member
states must greatly expand biofuel use—preferably ‘advanced
biofuels’ by the 2020 deadline. Despite that aim, such fuels will
not be ready in time, as the UK government quietly acknowl-
edged in 2010 [38].
Nevertheless wider economic aims drive biofuel R&D. If
technically successful, lignocellulosic butanol would be a
better functional substitute for petrol, as well as offering the
UK a competitive advantage for partnerships between academ-
ic institutions and companies. In a biorefinery perspective,
moreover, theR&Dprovides a platform for high-value products,
which are deemed necessary in order for advanced biofuels
to become economically viable. ‘Further understanding the
potential of co-products for these conversion routes could lead
to high-value biochemicals which could have a significant
effect on overall plant economics’, according to the above
DECC-sponsored report [39].
Thus biofuel research opens up wider agendas for
public-sector scientists and companies, together seeking
patents on novel processes. According to a scientist who
carries out such research under contract from a petrochem-
ical company:
Chemical companies think: ‘we will have to solve these
problems as well…’ So the research going into biofuels
will have a spin-off into useful chemicals… Government
imperatives for fuel and the commercial need for
replacement chemicals are a happy synergy (interview,
BSBEC, 06.07.11).
Resonating with the BBSRC's visions of a bioeconomy, [40]
such expectations help to explain why R&D priorities favour
next-generation biofuels and higher-value, low-volume
products.4.2. Scale-up: beyond the ‘valley of death’?
Looking beyond R&D, a key aim has been to overcome the
‘valley of death’which has generally kept UK research distant
from commercial application, especially in bioenergy [41].
According to a research manager:
In the UK we can produce very good science. But you've
got to put up quite a lot of money and expend quite a lot
of effort to convert that science into a commercial
application. If you've got it to the other side of the
valley of death, then people pick it up with open arms
(interview, BBSRC, 05.04.11).
According to a large energy company:
For the banks and other larger-scale investors, it would be
far too risky to invest in an early-stage company. At that
point, we were asking ‘What do you think the problem
is?’, and they all say it's the scale of the investment
because bioenergy plants are capital intensive. So that's
really the main challenge (interview, BP, 03.08.12).
To overcome the obstacle, a possible solution was the
Bioenergy Capital Grants Scheme, meant to provide ‘market
pull’ by subsidising energy production [42]. It funded
‘conventional technology plant’ as well as novel technologies
[43]. It sought to give an opportunity to various trajectories,
often by renewing grants over a decade (interview, DECC,
14.08.12).
The scheme provided numerous grants for up to 5 year
duration, with some successes. But the terms often were too
difficult, even for some near-market technologies such as
CHP. According to an industry lobby:
The government will give you a ﬁve-year window in
which to build your project; if your project comes on line
late, it will be penalised. Now, that makes sense from a
government policy perspective… But no power station is
ever commissioned on time; they are always late because
they are quite complicated things. So the risk associated
with penalties is too big, and investors just walk away
(interview, CHPA, 19.06.12).
Greater difficulties arose for technologies more distant
from commercial readiness. Despite several years' funding,
some did not reach the stage of working technically or
attracting private-sector investment.
When you talk to developers, the answer is always that
we are 2–3 years away, or 10 years away. And if you talk
to them 5–10 years later, it's always the same story: we
are 3 years away, or we are 10 years away. So you get
stuck: you are paying very large support levels, but you
are not getting the energy generation. You may not be
notably moving down the innovation pathway. Then as a
government you have got a tough decision to say: right,
this isn't working, so perhaps we should be concentrating
elsewhere… And 4–5 years normally isn't enough for
R&D, not even enough to build a biomass combustion
plant—certainly not from the standpoint of winning your
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14.08.12).
The numerous difficulties were eventually diagnosed as a
systemic problem of the funding arrangement. By 2012 DECC
judged that the Scheme was an inappropriate way to fund
R&D. Rather than a Ministry alone judging prospects for
future success, this role was broadened to industry through
other arrangements.
In 2009 the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI) was set up
as ‘a UK-based private company formed from global industries
and the UK government’, with an initial investment fund of
£1 bn. Industrialmembers includemajor energy, oil andvehicle
multinationals (e.g. EDF, E.On, Shell, BP, Rolls Royce, etc.).
ETI's Energy System Modelling Environment (ESME) helps
‘to identify key areas for strategic investment’, especially for
bringing together all components necessary for real-world
systems, not simply technologies.
As contributors to ETI, industry members have a say into
what we do and how we do it. But each industry member
only has 1 vote in 12, so they cannot railroad certain
activities. The government is the biggest member but has
only 50% of the clout (interview, ETI, 08.06.12).
For near-commercial scale-up, ETI reaches agreement
among several companies which thereby share the high costs
and privately appropriate the economic benefits, especially
through patents:
For the middle stage we have the Energy Technologies
Institute, a partnership where government invests a certain
amount. We have multinational companies who join and
invest signiﬁcantly more. And only partners within ETI
get the beneﬁts. So it encourages multinationals to put
signiﬁcant amounts of money in a pot because they feel it's
offering them a sustainable competitive advantage. Where-
as normally when governments invest in research studies,
we encourage that work to be shared as widely as possible
(interview, DECC, 14.08.12).
From industry's standpoint, the arrangement helps to
minimise longer-term financial risks:
The UK has little appetite to take the ﬁnancial risk; hence
ETI was set up as a Club. De-risking technology means
identifying technological needs in the longer term, as a
basis for pooling company funds and thus reducing the
ﬁnancial exposure of any one company, with 50% of the
funds from government (interview, ETI, 08.06.12).
For the bioenergy area, ETI's industrial contributions feature
fossil-fuel companies, and at least two bioenergy programme
managers have come fromBP. In parallelwith ETI's activities, the
feasibility and benefits of various bioenergy pathways were
being evaluated byDECC's LowCarbon Innovation Co-ordination
Group. Its report evaluated technoscientific readiness, prospects
and needs for various conversion processes. The group's
membership includes ETI and the Technology Strategy Board,
which is governed mainly by industry representatives. The
evaluation also drew on ETI's ESME exercises. As another
important contribution, ETI's Strategic Advisory Group includesthe Director of the National Non-Food Crops Centre (NNFFC), a
hybrid organisation combining expert advice to government
with a private consultancy role. Its expert reports have resonated
with ETI's priorities, e.g. on gasification [44].
In this overall state-industry arena, some future expecta-
tions have been made more credible. These informed ETI's
decisions to invest in major demonstration projects, espe-
cially for gasification and bioenergy-CCS, as described next in
turn.
5. Gasiﬁcation: ﬂexibly converting biowaste
Gasification uses high temperatures to convert biomass
into syngas, which can be further converted into various
energy forms. With a long history, especially in converting
coal to liquid fuel, gasification has recently attracted greater
interest as a flexible means to convert various wastes.
Gasification has undergone much technoscientific develop-
ment abroad but only sporadically in the UK, at least until
recently.
In the late 1990s state support was directed at new
technologies, especially gasification and pyrolysis, with expec-
tations for short-term commercial scale-up. In particular the
ARBRE (Arable Biomass Renewable Energy) demonstration
project was an integrated gasification-combined cycle system
to generate electricity from dedicated energy crops. Its two
funding sources had contradictory aims. A 15-year contract
from the Dept of Trade & Industry (DTI), under the Non-Fossil
Fuel Obligation (NFFO), was intended to support reliable, ready
technologies. In parallel, EC funds aimed to support experi-
mental technologies [45]. Such scale-up efforts for experimen-
tal technologies were premature, according to an academic
study:
The targeting of more advanced or novel technologies was
even a greater failure as the most advanced technologies
have failed to materialise. This focus on novel technolo-
gies has come at the expense of support to more mature
technologies which would have helped the biomass
energy sector to grow and expand [46].
In those ways, high expectations mobilised resources but
resulted in a double failure—gaining little technical progress,
and even damaging the government's reputation. By default,
energy supply companies had to import other conversion
technologies which were ready for commercial use—the
reverse of the original aim. Consequently, the government
has been criticised for ‘picking losers’.
More recently, future expectations for gasification again
have been raised by government and expert reports.What role
for UK investment and expertise? According to a 2009 expert
report, gasification will be developed first abroad. So a key aim
is to develop UK technoscientific skills which have broader
economic relevance. According to a report published by the
National Non-Food Crops Centre, a hybrid organisation com-
bining expert advice to governmentwith a private consultancy
role:
The gasiﬁcation and pyrolysis pilots would provide general
project development related skills that might be applicable
to biomass to liquids, and bring to bear UK strengths in
engineering and petro-chemicals… ‘theremay be economic
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strategic position in the sector and investing in supporting
the development of technologies and skills in pilot or
demonstration activities’ [47].
Whenever gasification becomes more efficient and flexi-
ble, the technology is expected to provide input-substitutes
for oil. R&D priorities favour gasification as a flexible way to
fuel current transport infrastructure; it can generate ‘drop in’
solutions particularly in the difficult sectors of aviation and
heavy goods vehicles. For both sectors, the government has
indicated that biofuels should be prioritised because ‘no
other solution is available’, according to the NNFCC Director
[48].
In those ways, gasification has been expected to convert
various wastes into novel biofuels, as well as create substantial
employment. According to later study by the National Non-Food
Crops Centre, the technology could generate substantial trans-
port fuel, even from household rubbish, while also generating
much employment:
Under favourable economic conditions and strong improve-
ments in policy support, projections suggest advanced
biofuels could meet up to 4.3% of the UK's renewable
transport fuel target by 2020…. At this scale advanced
biofuels would save the UK 3.2 million tonnes of CO2 each
year – equivalent to taking nearly a million cars off the road
– and create 6000 full-time construction jobs and over 2000
permanent jobs supplying and operating the plants [49].
Drafted during 2010–12, a report from DECC's Low Carbon
Innovation Co-ordination Group emphasised future benefits
‘from select conversion technologies which are capable of
converting wastes and other sustainable feedstocks’. Other
countries were developing gasification but were not expected
to focus on biomethane production. Earlier-stage conversion
has the highest potential for reducing the cost of GHG savings.
Technoscientific advances would improve the conversion
efficiency of gasification, thus eventually making its energy
cheaper than from combustion. ‘Proof of concept at scale is
the primary innovation need for these technologies, which
could realise much of their cost reduction potential over the
next decade’, [50] thus anticipating public benefits sooner
rather than later.
Citing the LCICG report, UK Bioenergy Strategy highlighted
gasification as one of three long-term ‘hedging options’ to deal
with various future uncertainties. Foreseen benefits feature a
flexible means to convert various feedstocks, e.g. carbon-based
waste such as paper, petroleum-based wastes like plastics, and
organic materials such as food scraps. Such conversion could
offer environmental advantages over waste incineration, as
regards waste disposal and energy yield [51].
To move forward gasification, the Energy Technologies
Institute invested in a demonstrator project, justified partly
as a contribution to 2050 targets:
The ETI has announced it is seeking partners for a new
£13 million project to help design and build a next-
generation energy-from-waste demonstrator plant to
convert typical wastes into electricity and heat. The ETI
is focused on the acceleration of the development of
affordable, clean and secure technologies that will helpthe UK meet its legally binding 2050 climate change
targets… [52].
This investment anticipates a UK competitive advan-
tage in waste-gasification technology (interview, ETI,
08.06.12).
As another benefit, gasification is also expected to make
biowaste-CHP more economically viable: ‘Gasification sys-
tems can also be used for small-scale heat and CHP
applications, which are commercially deployed with sup-
port in some countries’ [53]. Biowaste is spatially distribut-
ed, thus offering opportunities for decentralisation. In this
basis, UK policy has long advocated biowaste-CHP as a
means to decentralise production, while also enhancing use
of waste heat, thus saving GHG emissions [54].
An extra aim is to enhance compatibility with carbon
capture & storage (CCS). As a major difficulty, BioSNG systems
have ‘a poor compatibilitywith CCS systems’, as a reason for the
little global investment in gasification [55]. This obstacle was
turned into a challenge: gasification ‘also enables carbon
capture & storage, which is becoming a major topic across
Europe as it delivers negative GHG emissions’ (interview, ETI,
08.06.12; see also next section).
In all those ways, gasification has been newly funded
through expectations for multiple economic and environmen-
tal benefits, as elaborated by expert studies. Such expectations
have been made more credible through new arenas linking UK
policy aims with industry interests.
6. Bioenergy-CCS: mitigating high-carbon systems
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) has been globally under
developmentmainly for gas and coal-fired plants,with potential
adaptation to bioenergy such as co-firing. CCS has a central role
in the government's Carbon Plan to fulfil 2050 targets for GHG
reductions. Among three future scenarios, one greatly expands
bioenergy, which could bemade carbon-negative through a link
with CCS:
Future ‘Higher CCS, more bioenergy’ assumes the suc-
cessful deployment of CCS technology at commercial
scale and its use in power generation and industry,
supported by signiﬁcant natural gas imports, driven by
changes such as a reduction in fossil fuel prices as a result
of large-scale exploitation of shale gas reserves. It also
assumes low and plentiful sustainable bioenergy re-
sources processes [56].
More recently, UK expert reports emphasise the carbon-
saving benefits of using CCS in conjunction with biomass [57].
‘When applied to biomass firing, CCS can reduce emissions even
further, potentially as a source of relatively low-cost negative
emissions’ [58]. This could cheapen GHG savings when co-firing
biomass with fossil fuels.
The UK Bioenergy Strategy emphasises adaptation of CCS
to biomass feedstock:
Bioenergy carbon capture and storage (BE-CCS) could
produce bioenergy in the form of biopower, biohydrogen,
bioheat and biofuels, but most signiﬁcantly permanently
stream underground the waste carbon from these pro-
cesses that was taken from the atmosphere by plant
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sphere or ‘negative emissions’ [59].
A biohydrogen alternative is envisaged for the period after
2030, when ‘the priority should be for continued use of biomass
resource in process heating, and in the transport sector, either
through bioenergy hydrogen production with CCS or through
biofuels for aviation and shipping if CCS is not available’ [60].
As the Strategy emphasises, a CCS Roadmap had already
outlined steps being taken to achieve cost-competitive CCS.
However, ‘The relative costs and availability of the technol-
ogies are subject to significant uncertainty, especially for
unproven technologies in later periods, e.g. biohydrogen for
transport’ [61]. Given these uncertainties about cost and
feasibility, BE-CCS lies beyond the three ‘hedging options’
(interview, DECC, 14.08.12). According to some critics of
BE-CCS, its promise to provide carbon-negative emissions
depends upon numerous optimistic assumptions—about
biomass production, biomass combustion, carbon capture,
etc. [62].
To clarify ways forward, ETI allocated £0.5 m to a project
evaluating ‘Biomass to Power with CCS’, with a consortium
including academic and industrial partners. This study ‘identi-
fied a specific opportunity to develop capture technology
for new-build, pre-combustion coal capture based on physical
separation of CO2 from synthesis gas’, i.e. initially in coal plants.
It invited company proposals ‘for full-scale demonstration by
2015 and adoption into full scale commercial power applica-
tions by 2020’ [63].
CCS design faces infrastructural choices. The diffuse location
of biomass offers opportunities for decentralised systems.
According to an EPSRC Supergen study, biomass feedstock
within a localised design would enhance GHG savings:
While biomass co-ﬁring with coal offers an early route to
BE-CCS, a quite substantial (N20%) biomass component
may be necessary to achieve negative emissions in a co-
ﬁred CCS system. Smaller-scale BE-CCS, through co-location
of dedicated or co-combusted biomass on fossil CCS CO2
transport pipeline routes, is easier to envisage andwould be
potentially less problematic [64].
Nevertheless UK state bodies assume that BE-CCS will and
should complement centralised infrastructure: biomass is
foreseen as supplying a few large-scale centralised coal or gas
plants (interview, ETI, 08.06.12).
As another expectation, moreover, CCS is sought for
negative emissions that lighten the burden of GHG savings
from fossil fuels: ‘These negative emissions could then be used
to offset fossil fuel emissions fromother harder-to-decarbonise
sectors’ [65]. Put more explicitly: ‘Negative carbon emissions
could lower the cost of a low-carbon energy supply because
we could go on using gas, possibly even using coal, and
balance it out with CCS’ (interview, DECC, 14.08.12; cf. ETI
comment at bioenergy workshop, 20.11.12). Thus optimistic
expectations for BE-CCS complement longer-term depen-
dence on fossil fuel.
Several potential projects have encountered difficulties
before they would have begun. For CCS installation planned
at Longannet coal-fired plant in 2011, industrial partners
disagreed over the necessary state funding. CCS generally hasfaced many obstacles to investment. Companies see it as an
end-of-pipe cost, e.g. as an environmental burden necessary
to justify fossil energy, rather than as an economic benefit.
7. Algae conversion: shifting expectations and arenas
While previous sections have analysed how some
expectations and thus priorities became favoured within a
specific arena, the final case focuses on a high-level
aggregation, algal technology, and how this became differ-
entiated across arenas. Algal biofuels gained credible
expectations for several benefits, as a basis for substantial
state funds through the Carbon Trust priorities; but DECC
soon changed its criteria and abandoned the entire pro-
gramme. By contrast, more specific algal pathways gained
funds via various public–private partnerships. These out-
comes illustrate diverse links between arenas, expectations
and their credibility, especially at lower-level aggregations.
7.1. Expectations for algal bioenergy
Algal biomass sources have been expected to avoid any
conflicts over arable land, thus avoiding the ‘food versus fuel’
controversy, while also generating diverse valuable products.
These interdependent expectations have made overall cred-
ibility dependent on multiple pathways, while also offering
flexibility in shifting expectations to bypass obstacles.
Future expectations and obstacles have been elaborated
in various expert reports. As a special advantage for the UK,
algal technology could build on national strengths: ‘in the
areas of fundamental plant science, micro and macro-algae,
fermentation, pyrolysis, we also have industrial capacity for
some thermo-chemical routes and bio-chemical routes’ [66].
For producing aviation fuel, algal feedstock could offer much
greater GHG savings than oilseeds. However, ‘These routes
are unlikely to be commercial before algae can be cultivated
economically at a large scale’. For algal systems to become
economically viable, moreover, higher-value products will
be necessary: ‘increased production will not necessarily
mean greater use as an energy source, owing to the higher
profitability of macroalgae in pharmaceutical, chemical and
food markets’ [67]. Likewise, ‘Both algal forms may provide
low value, high volume products such as livestock feeds, as
well as high value, low volume speciality chemicals such as
carotenoids and omega oils’ [68].
A UK strategy report distinguishes between optimal path-
ways for micro and macro-algae (seaweed):
These were chosen based on a high-level assessment of
deployment potential and because they have the potential
to be grown in areas unsuitable for food crops, which is
potentially more sustainable than ﬁrst generation energy
crops. Regarding conversion routes, microalgae is assessed
as being used to produce transport fuels, and macroalgae
(seaweed) is assessed as being used to produce biomethane
in adapted anaerobic digestion systems [69].
Interest in algae has been shifting to macro-algae (seaweed),
which can be mass-produced in temperate climates.
At a national level in terms of commodity-scale energy-
type feedstocks, micro-algae is losing favour. Macro-algae
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to say whether it's viable (interview, ETI, 08.0.12).
BP is a major global investor in biofuels R&D but has funded
none in the UK. Judging that the best expertisewas in theUS, BP
established the Energy Biosciences Institute in Berkeley.
According to the Institute's report, fuel production from
microalgae will be expensive, even with relatively favourable
assumptions (e.g. low-cost system design, productivity algae
cultivation, high oil content, low-cost harvesting and process-
ing). Of various potential pathways, aviation fuel is especially
promising [70]. According to theUSDept of Energy,micro-algae
yield 30 timesmore energy per acre than land crops such as soy
beans and can grow in seawater. Let us examinehow analogous
expectations gained credibility among UK arenas for funding
algal bioenergy.
7.2. Carbon Trust programme funded and terminated
Since its establishment in 2001, the Carbon Trust has
helped businesses to reduce GHG emissions by various
means. It also runs ‘technology acceleration’ projects, aimed
at identifying regulatory, financial and technical barriers to
technology adoption, e.g. through trials and demonstration
projects. It has had six main accelerators: biomass heat, low
carbon buildings, industrial energy efficiency, micro com-
bined heat and power, marine energy and offshore wind.
Within that framework, the government allocated
£6 million to the Carbon Trust's Advanced Bioenergy
Directed Research Accelerator [71]. This included an aim
to develop algae as a biofuel source. Anticipating resource
benefits, algal technology could avoid land-use issues by
growing algae in seawater, wastewater or non-arable land.
But algae remained distant from commercial feasibility,
unlike the other accelerators.
In 2008 this initiative was expanded into the Algae Biofuels
Challenge, a seven-year programme supported by DECC and
the Department for Transport. It aimed to ‘develop and prove
leading UK algae biofuel technologies for export to other
countries to help reduce global carbon emissions from aviation
and road transport whilst generating significant UK economic
benefit’ [72]. As a key rationale for technology export, the
northern European climate was not conducive for large-scale
algae growth.
The programme aimed ‘to commercialise the use of algae
biofuel as an alternative to fossil-based oil by 2020’, especially
for aviation uses:
The major advantage of algae over other biofuel feed-
stocks, in particular feedstocks that provide oil for jet fuel
and diesel, such as palm, is that it is more sustain-
able from both an environmental and socio-economic
perspective.
As an early-stage technology, algae offered a special oppor-
tunity, even a ‘multi-billion pound opportunity’, according to
DrMarkWilliamson, InnovationsDirector at the Carbon Trust. To
fulfil that opportunity:
… we will be combining the UK's undoubted expertise in
the area with our unique knowledge and experience of
commercialising early stage low carbon technologies, togive us the best possible chance of successfully producing
cost-competitive algal biofuel at scale [73].
To choose the best research teams, the Carbon Trust
recruited prominent scientists, many based in the USA;
hence the 2008 programme launch was held in Seattle.
So the programme was unilaterally funding transatlantic
cooperation.
The idea was to bring together the best technology in the
UK under the guidance of international experts. It was all
going well. We did the landscaping and stakeholder
engagement in 2008; the programme was launched later
that year in Seattle. We started delivery at the beginning
of 2010 (interview, Carbon Trust, 03.11.11).
The research was conducted by a ‘dream team’, compris-
ing eleven UK institutions [74]. This team had the task to find
a method for producing 70 billion litres of algae biofuel a
year by 2030. This would be equivalent to 6% of global road
transport diesel, saving over 160 million tonnes of CO2 every
year. The Carbon Trust planned to invest £8 million over
three years into the programme [75].
The programme manager emphasised its credible model
and expertise: ‘We created a model that was very credible; it
was recognised as being very credible. We elevated it to an
international stage, we were so ahead of everyone else’
(interview, Carbon Trust, 03.11.11).
Although not directly involving industry, the algae pro-
grammebrought together expertise to anticipate questions that
industry would ask and outcomes that would attract investors:
We hired the leading experts in the world. A lot of people
don't like that because they ﬁnd it anti-innovation. But
this is what investors do. We used experts in techno-
economics to look at where the cost breakthrough needed
to come from and therefore where the innovation needed
to come from. We did a carbon-life cycle analysis – the
ﬁrst of its kind in algae. We did a market-potential
analysis to look at whether there is scalability to make it
worthwhile. All technological programmes funded by our
organisation go through the same process (interview,
Carbon Trust, 03.11.11).
With a budget of £3–6 m, Phase One funded research,
involving 74 scientists. Phase Two was expected to scale up
and integrate the various processes developed in Phase One.
But beforehand the entire programme was terminated by
DECC in early 2011, less than a year after the start of the
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government.
Although reasons were not publicly stated, some were
conveyed to the Carbon Trust: namely, because the algae
programme was at ‘the early stage of its technological
development’, and because ‘the technology was not going to
be deployed in the UK’, as DECC told the programme
manager [5]. The programme had originally gained credi-
bility for expectations to commercialise ‘early-stage tech-
nology’ for export—a focus which soon became grounds for
termination under a new government.
The programme died because of political decision rather
than any rational basis. Research priorities change in
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good case study in the absurd way that public funding is
managed (interview, Carbon Trust, 03.11.11).
As an extra potential reason, some observers questioned a
slippage into hype:
Part of the rationale was to get some good, publicly
available, shared data between several different groups on
what really is possible and consider whether you ought to
give more funding. In that way you can make a decent
public well-informed decision. Unfortunately… everyone
gets excited and thinks, ‘We are doing this because algae
is going to be great’ – as opposed to ‘We are doing this
because we want to know whether algae is going to be
great’ (interview, E4tech, 03.08.12).
Doubts also arose about how to enforce patents. The Carbon
Trust algae programme had originally emphasised the task to
‘secure licenses to all intellectual property’ [76]. It carefully
planned arrangements to share and protect IP (interview,
Carbon Trust, 03.11.11). But some experts questioned how a
patent-holder could enforce such rights in Southern countries
where the technology would be applied.
There are people who have had doubts about how you
protect IP in some of these areas, but I think it is more
geographical – protecting IP outside the UK…. People
have less conﬁdence about whether it [the product] is
easily copy-able and whether you would end up leaking
value (interview, E4tech, 03.08.12).
Another factor was a general policy move to eliminate or
reducemanyquangos, i.e. quasi-autonomous non-governmental
organisations, dependent mainly on government funds. Around
the same time as terminating the algae programme, DECC cut
the Carbon Trust's 2011–12 budget by 40%. More generally, ‘the
Carbon Trust has been challenged by the growth of other policy
initiatives in this area and is struggling to differentiate itself from
and legitimise itself vis-à-vis these initiatives’ [77]. Indeed, it was
being marginalised through wider policy changes and budget
cuts. Meanwhile funds were increased for scale-up projects
through the Energy Technologies Institute, closely involving
industry proposals and finance (see Section 4.2).7.3. Public–private arrangements expand
Despite termination of the Algae Biofuels Challenge
programme, there were new arenas for algal research. Hosted
by the Biosciences Knowledge Transfer Network, the Algal
Bioenergy Special Interest Group (AB-SIG) is a joint network
between NERC and the Technology Strategy Board. The
network provides a forum for circulating future expectations,
evaluating prospects and presenting successful initiatives
[78]. As a special opportunity for algae, ‘If we can put an
“environmental” tag on a product, then it can make more
money; the future is very bright and the possibilities are
endless’, declared the AB-SIG Chair.Speaking to an international conference, she elaborated
the possibilities:
Extraction of high-value components of algae (e.g. carot-
enoids, anti-oxidants) could help underpin the economic
viability of algae-based bioreﬁneries. By-products could be
used as a protein-enriched source of animal feed or to
capture energy within the system e.g. through anaerobic
digestion for CH4 production [79].
At the AB-SIG's own 2012 conference, speakers emphasised
that biomass sustainability and productivity remain a major
problem, even for second-generation biofuels. Large-scale
low-value fuel production may not become commercially
viable, so higher-value products may be necessary. Algae
could provide a solution, according to an expert study [80].
As a shared view, R&D priorities should relate closely to
industry needs: ‘Finding out what the clients really want
from algal bioenergy is challenging. One needs to find out
what they want; otherwise one is wasting time’ (speaker
at AB-SIG conference, 20.06.12). As another caveat, some
patents may not be defensible in legal procedures. Much
current research had already been done, even with results
published. Researchers have not carried out an adequate
literature survey since the 1980s, so they unwittingly repeat
previous research.
Most algae research is re-inventing the wheel. Many
researchers have not done a literature search. So their
patents could be challenged on grounds that the knowl-
edge is not an inventive step [5].
To address various doubts and obstacles, public-sector
researchers have developed several strategies, e.g. better-
targeted biofuels, higher-value products, rigorously novel
approaches, closer links with industry, etc. From such strate-
gies, public-sector bodies have gained funds or created
partnerships with companies, some based abroad. Those efforts
can be illustrated by several projects.
Cranfield University has focused on aviation fuel with
funds from the airline industry. Called 4th generation biofuel,
this initiative seeks to enhance algae production as feedstock:
Algae can be an eco-friendly substitute for fossil fuel or
synthetic chemicals…. Each generation of biofuels will be
greener than the previous one…. Market drivers of
aviation biofuel include: fuel security, macro-economics,
niche markets de-risking new technology in scale-up…
Aviation-biofuel from algae may seem like sci-ﬁ now, but
it's not a million miles away [81].
The Cranfield project foresees special opportunities for
aviation fuel from algae:There are two reasons for a special connection. The aviation
industry seeks a reliable, abundant biomass source which
will not compete with other uses or with land use. And
seawater micro-algae can produce oils which are specially
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already exist, but they need a better engineering design
for viable large-scale production (interview, Cranﬁeld,
20.06.12).
A public-sector institute, NottinghamMicroalgae Biorefinery,
has designed a process for various ‘green’ products sought by
industry. This initiative has been designed for low-volume
high-value products. As an incentive for private investment,
companies seek to replace petrochemical sources with bio-
materials for their pharmaceutical products. For the production
facility, the efficient photo bioreactor (PBR) has proprietary
technologywhich canbe licensedmorewidely; benefits are to be
negotiated among the industrial partners. Boots has a Combined
Heat and Power (CHP) facility at their UK production site in the
UK; the PBR will be sited adjacent to the CHP plant to take
advantage of synergies, e.g. enabling CHP flue-gas to be pumped
to the PBR to supplement algae growth through enriched CO2
[82]. The researchers expect to valorise the IP, partly thanks to
their prior literature search:
The ﬁrst protection issue for IP is a claim that the basic
knowledge already existed. I chose our research angle
because it is truly novel; this also may help protect it from
being copied (interview, 20.06.12, Nottingham Microalgae
Bioreﬁnery).
A macroalgae route to a ‘green’ image is illustrated by an
Irish company developing substitutes for chemical-based
additives in aquaculture and animal feed. Impetus comes
partly from more stringent European regulation of antibi-
otics. Based on seaweed, ‘Ocean Harvest’ nutrients have
already gone into large-scale commercial production. Tests
have indicated GHG savings in the production process and
improvements in animal health [83].
A public-sector institute, Scottish Bioenergy, has been
exploring similar routes through macroalgae, while also broad-
ening its original aims to encompass higher-value products such
as ‘natural’ feed for animals and fish. Algae-to-biogas pathways
have a symbiosis with anaerobic digestion, whosewastewater in
turn can be used as a fertiliser. In exploring these diverse algal
pathways, ‘Scottish Bioenergy has become less Scottish’, i.e.more
dependent on international investors [84].
A similar globalisation tendency has arisen in several UK
public-sector initiatives for algal products. They have sought
partners abroad, e.g. the oil company Repsol [85]. In such ways,
competitiveness means that UK initiatives compete against each
other—by contrast with policy discourse about UK R&D promot-
ing a national economic advantage and growth.8. Conclusions: arenas of expectations
The UK government has promoted bioenergy for several
policy aims—to decarbonise the economy in cost-effective
ways, as well as to gain national benefits such as a
competitive advantage, technology export, energy security
and waste management. Through claims or promises to
provide such benefits, bioenergy promoters have sought
state funds for various innovation pathways. For some
pathways (such as advanced biofuels and gasification),expert reports have acknowledged greater technical diffi-
culties, implying longer timescales and larger investment
necessary before commercial viability—often as grounds to
allocate considerable state investment. How do some
innovation pathways become priorities for state funds?
Somepathways havebeen favouredby specific state-industry
arrangements, which serve as ‘arenas of expectations’. Collective
expectations have been shaped by close exchanges between
state bodies, industry and expert consultancies. Industry has
informed expert reports on research needs, technical prospects
and future benefits, in ways conflating public and private
interests, especially the aim to maintain and justify current
infrastructure as ‘low-carbon’. Links between arenas, more
credible expectations and innovation priorities are summarised
in Table 1, as recapitulated in the following paragraphs.
Funding ‘strategic research’, research councils have justified
their bioenergy priorities in terms of national needs and policy
aims. Scientists have proposed R&D agendas as means to fulfil
those aims and to attract industry co-financing,which has been
an advantage in competing for grant proposals. Such arrange-
ments have resulted in weak support for hydrogen fuel cells,
while directing funds towards advanced biofuels around
several expectations—as an environmentally sustainable
means to fulfil mandatory targets by 2020, as an innovation
complementing companies' past investment in vehicle-energy
infrastructure, and as a step towards higher-value products.
Collective expectations for future biofuels illustrate how
‘next-generation’ technologies can become self-justifying
[86]. For advanced biofuels, extra economic benefits are
foreseen from UK technoscientific strengths entering global
partnerships which gain intellectual property. The global
character of such linkages has been explicit. This contrasts
with UK research policy in general, which has justified R&D
as a direct means to national economic growth [87].
For commercial scale-up, novel pathways need capital
investment, with great uncertainty about necessary costs and
timescales for technical success. The Bioenergy Capital Grants
Scheme funded a wide range of pathways, but this support
was inadequate, especially for less-ready technologies. DECC
had an unclear basis for judgements about which pathways
should still gain funds. Given such difficulties, the scheme is
being abandoned.
ETI was established with a club structure, whereby large
companies jointly choose and fund expensive scale-up pro-
jects, expecting multiple economic benefits. Here the same
actor has played the roles of technology enactor and selector,
thus blurring their boundary in priority-setting processes (see
Section 2.2, diagram). Two examples: Despite earlier technical
failures, gasification gained greater funds through expectations
for technology export and cheaper waste management. For
bioenergy-CCS, expectations for GHG savings help to maintain
current carbon-intensive infrastructure such as the internal
combustion engine and coal-fired electricity-only plants.
The Carbon Trust programme emphasised national tech-
noscientific expertise around algal biofuels, while also
anticipating UK industry's future needs but with no direct
involvement. This large programme was prematurely aban-
doned by the government, apparently for several reasons,
especially a new government shifting the criteria for expecta-
tions. Despite the programme's termination, UK public-sector
institutes have gained company investment for other algal
203L. Levidow et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 87 (2014) 191–204projects, especially aiming at aviation fuel and higher-value
products. Project managers emphasise strategies to optimise
market value and defend intellectual property, thus addressing
earlier doubts and so enhancing credibility. Thus algal bioenergy
illustrates a lower-level differentiation of arenas and pathways.
In sum: Through various state-industry arrangements, some
expectations have been made more credible, thus justifying
and prioritising resource allocation. Conversely, to incentivise
private-sector investment, government has sought credibility for
its commitment to bioenergy innovation and future markets.
These dual efforts illustrate the reciprocal character of
promise-requirement cycles, whereby promises are turned
into requirements for state sponsors as well as for innovators.
The credibility of expectations has been linked with UK
economic and environmental aims. Interdependent expecta-
tions have made overall credibility dependent on multiple
pathways, while also shifting expectations to bypass obstacles.
When encountering technical difficulties or delays, pathways
and their expectations have been broadened, e.g. to waste
management or higher-value products, especially through new
arenas. Thus the concept ‘arenas of expectations’ helps to
explain howsomepathways gain favour as innovation priorities.
Hype cycles have undergone shifts in expectations, arenas and
priorities being favoured there.
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